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Abstract
In this note, we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolymodel inwhich products are
differentiated ”à la Hotelling”. We start by assuming that only one of the two firms faces
a capacity constraint. For this particular case, we characterize the equilibrium payoff of
the unconstrained firm for the complete domain of capacity levels.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of price competition in the presence of capacity constraints has been given a
dramatic impulse by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983); building on Levitan and Shubik (1972),
they pioneered the analysis of capacity commitment as a tool to alleviate price competition.
A key feature of the literature that followed them is a (quasi) exclusive focus on homoge-
neous industries. Regarding industrieswith differentiatedproducts, the analysis of Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition has mostly remained confined to extending the conjecture already
made by Edgeworth, when he claims that "It will be readily understood that the extent of in-
determinatness [resulting from the Edgeworth cycles] diminishes with the diminution of the
degree of correlation between the articles" (Edgeworth (1925), p.121)". Examples are Shapley
and Shubik (1969), Friedman (1988) or Benassy (1989). Themain conclusion of these papers
is that the presence of product differentiation enlarges the set of capacities for which the ex-
istence of a pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium exists. However, very few positive results exist
for the case of differentiated markets where this pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. To
the best of our knowledge, only three papers directly address this issue. Furth and Kovenock
(1993) consider a game where prices are set sequentially and study the issue of endogenous
timing. They allow for binding capacity constraints for the two firms. Cabral et al. (1998) also
assume a sequential price setting in order to obtain explicit payoffs. Krishna (1989) charac-
terizes a mixed strategy equilibrium in a pricing game between a quota constrained foreign
producer and a domestic firm. Prices are set simultaneously. However, the equilibrium she
characterizes is only valid within a limited range of parameters’ value.1 Clearly enough addi-
tional work is called for in order to improve our understanding of the nature of competition
in the presence of capacity constraints and product differentiation. This is precisely the aim
of the present note.
We consider a Hotelling duopoly model pricing game with fixed locations. We assume
that one firm is possibly capacity constrained while the other holds an abritrarily large ca-
pacity. For this particular Bertrand-Edgeworth game, we characterize the payoff of the large
capacity firm. We show that this firm either earns the Hotelling equilibrium payoffs or her
minmax payoff (which depends negatively on the other’s capacity). The note can thus be
viewed as applying and extending the model proposed by Krishna (1989) where we charac-
terize the domestic firm’s equilibrium payoff for the whole range of quota values, i.e. also
for quota levels where the equilibrium identified by Krishna does not exist. By the same to-
ken, our results extend of Levitan and Shubik (1972) to amarket with differentiated products.
Taking a broader perspective, our analysis takes a first step towards the characterization of
firms’ equilibrium payoffs in similar models where both firms are capacity constrained.
1While this is clearly not problematic in the problem considered byKrishna (1989), one needs amore general
characterization in order to address stage games issues. Boccard and Wauthy (2003) also provide some related
characterization.
1
2 The Hotellingmodel with Limited Production Capacities
We follow the standard assumptions of the Hotelling model. There is a continuum of con-
sumers identified by their type x uniformly distributed in the [0,1] interval. The two firms
are sitting at the extremes of the market and sell an homogeneous product; the transporta-
tion cost is normalized to unity. The utility of a consumer with type x is thus S−x−p1 should
he buy product 1, S−1+x−p2 should he buy product 2, and 0 if he refrains from consuming,
where S > 0 and finite. Consumers maximize their utility given the set of prices (p1,p2).
The novelty we introduced is the production capacity. We consider exclusively k1 = 1
and k2 ≤ 1. Marginal cost of production is 0 up to the capacity limit and equal to +∞ other-
wise. Firmsmaximize profits by setting (positive) prices non-cooperatively. Our equilibrium
concept in Nash equilibrium, possibly in non-degenerated mixed strategies.
A monopoly receives a positive demand only if her price is lesser than the reservation
value S. Next, the potential market for firm 1 consists of all types lesser than S−p1 while for
firm 2, it consists of all types greater than 1−S+p2 ; they overlap only when p1+p2 ≤ 2S−1
in which case the market is "covered". If this happens the indifferent consumer has type
x˜(p1,p2)≡ 1−p1+p22 . We may now characterize the demand addressed to each firm as
D1(p1,p2)= 0 iff p1 ≥min
{
S,p2+1
}
(1)
= S−p1 iff p1 ∈
[
max
{
S−1,2S−1−p2
}
;S
]
(2)
= x˜(p1,p2) iff p1 ∈
[
max
{
0,p2−1
}
;min
{
p2+1,2S−1−p2
}]
(3)
= 1 iff p1 ≤min
{
p2−1,S−1
}
(4)
and
D2(p1,p2)= 0 iff p2 ≥min
{
S,p1+1
}
(5)
= S−p2 iff p2 ∈
[
max
{
S−1,2S−1−p1
}
;S
]
(6)
= 1− x˜(p1,p2) iff p2 ∈
[
max
{
0,p1−1
}
;min
{
p1+1,2S−1−p1
}]
(7)
= 1 iff p2 ≤min
{
p1−1,S−1
}
(8)
The domains defining these demands are illustrated by the plain lines on Figure 1 below.
For the sake of simplicity, we also assume S > 2 to ensure that competition cannot be avoided
i.e., each firm, if it were a monopoly, would want to cover the market.2
3 Sales Functions
Because of limited production capacities, firms’ salesmay differ from demands addressed to
them. Whenever D2(.)> k2, firm 2 is not able to meet demand and must ration consumers.
These rationed consumers may in turn report their purchase on the other product. In order
to identify firms’ sales under this configuration, we must specify a particular rationing rule;
it determines which types of consumers are actually rationed and therefore possibly report
their purchase on the other firm.
2The monopoly price is S2 while the lower price for enjoying monopoly demand is S − 1. In the standard
Hotelling literature, market coverage is almost invariably simply "assumed", i.e. S is arbitrarily large.
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H 1 Whenever D2(p1,p2)> k2, the efficient rationing rule applies.
Under H1, firm 2 serves in priority the types exhibiting the largest utility for product 2,
i.e. those belonging to [1−k2;1]. Using the characterization of D2(p1,p2), we identify two
critical values for p2 such that firm 2 is capacity constrained:
S−p2 ≥ k2 ⇔ p2 ≤ S−k2 (9)
1− x˜(p1,p2)≥ k2 ⇔ p2 ≤ 1−2k2+p1 (10)
Using equations (9), (10) and the specification ofD2(.), wemay define the sales’ function
for firm 2 as
S2(p1,p2)= 0 iff p2 ≥min
{
S,p1+1
}
(11)
= S−p2 iff p2 ∈
[
max
{
S−k2,2S−1−p1
}
;S
]
(12)
= 1− x˜(.) iff p2 ∈
[
p1+1−2k2;min
{
2S−1−p1,p1+1
}]
(13)
= k2 otherwise (14)
The possibility of rationing is illustrated on Figure 1 below by the addition of the grey and
hatched areas. In order to characterize firm 1’s sales function, we must identify the range of
prices in which firm 2 is constrained while some rationed consumers report their purchase
on firm 1. Under efficient rationing, we know that those rationed consumers exhibit types
between x˜(p1,p2) and 1−k2. Therefore, as long as S − (1−k2)− p1 > 0, all of the rationed
consumers report their purchase on firm 1, which therefore benefits from sales equal to 1−
k2. When p1 > S−1+k2 and firm 2 is constrained, firm 1 benefits frommonopoly sales S−p1.
Rewriting the conditionD2(.)≥ k2 as p1 ≥ p2+2k2−1, we characterize the sales function for
firm 1 usingD1(.) as follows:
S1(p1,p2)= 0 iff p1 ≥ S (15)
= S−p1 otherwise (16)
= 1−k2 iff p1 ∈
[
2k2−1+p2;S−1+k2
]
(17)
= x˜(.) iff p1 ∈
[
2k2−1+p2;min
{
p2+1,2S−1−p2
}]
(18)
= 1 iff p1 ≤min
{
p2−1,S−1
}
(19)
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Figure 1: Sales with one Capacity constraint
4 Equilibrium in the Pricing Game
We analyze the firm’s best responses in games where k1 = 1 and k2 ≤ 1. As appears from
the characterization of sales functions, firms’ payoffs defined by Ri (p1,p2)= piSi (p1,p2) for
i = 1,2, are continuous. Accordingly, there always exists a Nash equilibrium. We denote Fi
the (possibly mixed) strategy used by firm i in a Nash equilibrium and p−i (resp. p
+
i ) denotes
the lowest (resp. highest) price named by firm i in equilibrium. We may now state our first
result illustrated by the bold dashed line on Figure 1:
Lemma 1 The best response of the capacity constrained firm (#2) is given by
BR2(p1)=min
{
S−k2,max
{
1+p1
2 ,p1+1−2k2
}}
(20)
Proof: We notice that in the range where S2(.) is positive, it exhibits kinks. However, since
−∂(S−p2)∂p2 >−
∂(1−x˜(.))
∂p2
>−∂(k2)∂p2 , the sales’ function is concave over the corresponding domain.
As a consequence, the best response of firm 2 to any pure strategy played by firm 1 must be
unique.
The candidate best response in the domainwhere S2(.)= S−p2 is S2 but sincewe assumed
S > 2, this optimal price is smaller than S−1≤ S−k2 i.e., lies in the area where the capacity
constraint binds. Moving to that area, the best response amounts to sell the capacity at the
highest price, which is given either by p1+1−2k2 when the market is covered or by S−k2 in
the remaining case. Lastly, in the competition domainwhere S2(.)= 1−x˜(.), the best response
candidate is 1+p12 . To obtain BR2(.), it then remains to identify the relevant best response
candidate across the domain of prices, in order to obtain Lemma 1. ■
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, the capacity constrained firm (#2) will never play a price above
S−k2.
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Proof: Given the charaterization of BR2(.) provided in Lemma 1, it is immediate to see
that the revenue of firm 2 is strictly decreasing in own price p2 against any distribution of
prices p1 for p2 > S−k2. Therefore, p2 > S−k2 cannot be part of an equilibrium for firm 2. ■
Lemma 2 There exists k, pˆ2 and p˜2, such that in equilibrium, the best response of the uncon-
strained firm (#1) is
• if k2 ≥ k, BR1(p2)=
{
S−1+k2 iff p2 ≤ pˆ2
min
{
S−1,max
{
1+p2
2 ,p2−1
}}
iff p2 ≥ pˆ2
• if k2 ≤ k, BR1(p2)=
{
S−1+k2 iff p2 ≤ p˜2
min
{
S−1,p2−1
}
iff p2 ≥ p˜2
Proof: Wenote first that the sales function is continuous. However, it exhibits an outward
kink when we pass from segment (16 ) to (17) in the sales function. Whenever k2 < 1, the
revenue function of firm 1 is equal to p1(1−k2) along (17) and is therefore strictly increasing
in p1 in this domain. Moreover, this segment is relevant only to the extent that 2k2−1+p2 <
S−1+k2, which is true if only p2 < S−k2. When this last condition is satisfied, the revenue
R1(.) exibits a local maximum for p1 = S−1+k2 which precisely defines the frontier between
(16) and (17). The payoff for firm 1 at this price is pis1 ≡ (1−k2)(S−1+k2), a minmax value.
Along (18),R1(.) exhibits a candidate best response
1+p2
2 . The corresponding best reponse
candidate along (19) is given by min{p2−1,S−1} since R1(.) is strictly increasing along this
branch. SinceR1(.) is concave along (18) and (19), the best response candidate in this domain
is min
{
S−1,max
{
1+p2
2 ,p2−1
}}
which is displayed by the bold dotted line on Figure 1. We
check that 1+p22 > p2−1 whenever p2 < 3.
In order to characterize firm 1’s price best response, it remains now to compare the pay-
offs along max
{
1+p2
2 ,p2−1
}
to the minmax payoff pis1. Indeed, it is direct to see that the
minmax payoff is dominated by S−1. Firm 1’s payoff along 1+p22 equals
(1+p2)2
8 . Solving the
equation (1+p2)
2
8 =pis1 for p2 yields
pˆ2 ≡−1+
√
8(1−k2)(S−1+k2) (21)
Firm 1’s payoff along p2−1 is equal to p2−1 since S1(.)= 1 along this branch. Solving p2−1=
pis1 for p2 yields
p˜2 ≡ 1+ (1−k2)(S−1+k2) (22)
Solving either pˆ2 ≤ 3 or p˜2 ≥ 3 for k2 yields the critical capacity k ≡ 2−S+
p
S2−8
2 which deter-
mines whether the downward jump in the best reponse occurs along 1+p22 or p2−1. Putting
all these conditions together, we obtain the enunciated characterization of firm 1’s best re-
ponse. ■
Notice that this best response is not continuous, exhibiting a downward jump at either
pˆ2 or p˜2, depending on the value of k2.
Corollary 2 In equilibrium, the unconstrained firm (#1) will never play a price above S−1+k2.
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Proof: We know that the payoff of firm 1 is strictly decreasing in the monopoly region
(D1 = S −p1). Since the lower bound of this domain is given by S −1+k2 or less, whatever
the distribution of prices named by firm 2, firm 1 will never name a price above this treshold
value since its payoff is strictly decreasing in this domain. ■
As alreadymentioned, since firm’s payoffs are continuous the existence of an equilibrium
is not an issue here. However, because firm 1’s best reponse is not continuous, the existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium is problematic.
Lemma 3 The unique candidate for a pure strategy equilibrium is the Hotelling equilibrium
where p∗1 = p∗2 = 1.
Proof: When k2 = 1, it is well known that there exists a unique equilibrium p∗1 = p∗2 = 1.3
Whenever k2 < 1, it follows from Lemma 1 and 2 that the only other possible candidate is(
p1,p2
)= (S−1+k2,S−k2). However, it is immediate to check that pis1 < S−1−k2, the payoff
of firm 1 along p2−1. Therefore, the security price S−1+k2 is not a best reply to S−k2. ■
Lemma 4 In equilibrium, the support of mixed strategies for both firms is bounded from be-
low by the standard Hotelling price 1.
Proof: If p−1 < 1 then according to Lemma1, the lowest price that firm2 could name in this
equilibrium is defined by p−2 ≡
1+p−1
2 > p−1 . As a consequence, the lowest price firm 1 would
name in this equilibrium, according to Lemma 2 is
1+p−2
2 > 12
(
1+ 1+p
−
1
2
)
> p−1 , a contradiction
with the definition of p−1 . Accordingly, the lowest price named with positive probability by
firm 1must be larger than 1. Obviously, the same argument applies for firm 2. ■
We deduce as a corollary of Lemma 1, 2 and 4 that in equilibrium, the support of firm
1’s mixed strategy is included in [1;S−1+k2], the support of firm 2’s strategy is included in
[1;S−k2]. Let k¯ ≡ 12 (2−S+
p
S2−2) be the unique root of equation pˆ2 = 1.
Lemma 5 Suppose k2 ≥ k¯, then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium given by p∗1 = p∗2 = 1.
Proof: Notice first that this equilibriumexists for k2 = 1 since this is the standardHotelling
equilibrium. This equilibrium will continue to exist as long as the best response of firm 1
against p2 = 1 is given by 1+p22 . A necessary and sufficient condition for this is pˆ2 ≤ 1⇔ k2 ≥
k¯. In this case indeed, the two best responses cross in the relevant domain. ■
We are now in a position to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose k2 < k¯ , then there always exists an equilibrium in which the uncon-
strained firm (#1) earns its minmax payoff pis1.
3See for instance Mas-Collel et al. (1995), pp 396-398
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Proof: Whenever k2 < k¯, we have pˆ2 > 1 so that the Hotelling equilibrium does not ex-
ist. Therefore, by Lemma 3, there is no equilibrium in pure strategy. From Lemma 1, we
know that firm 2 will never name prices above S−k2 in equilibrium. Let us then consider a
candidate mixed strategy equilibrium.
Suppose that p+1 < S−1+k2, then according to Lemma 1, in this equilibrium, the upper
bound for prices namedwith positive probability by firm2 is givenbymax
{
1+p+1
2 ,p
+
1 +1−2k2
}
.
This maximum is
1+p+1
2 if p
+
1 ≤ 4k2−1; then firm 1’s revenue is strictly decreasing at p+1 for
any p2 ∈
[
1;
1+p+1
2
]
. This contradicts the fact that p+1 is named with positive probability in
equilibrium. Thus p+1 ≥ 4k2−1 must be satisfied. This implies that p+2 ≤ p+1 +1−2k2. How-
ever, against any mixed strategy of firm 2, the payoff of firm 1 measured at p+1 is equal to
p+1 (1−k2), which is strictly increasing if p+1 < S−1+k2. A contradiction.
We have thus shown p+1 ≥ S−1+k2 and using Lemma 2, we obtain p+1 = S−1+k2. Now, by
Lemma1, p+2 ≤ S−k2 so that the equilibriumpayoff of firm1whenmeasured at p+1 = S−1+k2
must then be equal to pis1. ■
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